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is pursuing a common law remedy which existed before the
enactment of the statute and which continues to exist in cases
not covered by the statute. It is incumbent upon the employer
to prove that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a bar to the
employee's ordinary remedy. [20b] There is no legal reason
why this rule should not apply to Popejoy's action as well
a~ to one by an employee against his own employer.
'rhe judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 7,
1951.

[L. A. No. 21830.

In Bank.

lVIay 11, 1951.]

.JOHAN RICHARD WALLACE SCHUMM, a Minor, etc.,
Appellant, v. PHIL BERG et al., as Executors, etc., Respondents.
[1] Illegitimacy-Support--Contract.-In an action by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for breach
of an oral contract entered into by the father and mother
for the support and education of the child, defendant cannot
successfully urge that the complaint alleges a contract entered
into by plaintiff's mother as his agent, which is therefore void
because a minor cannot give a delegation of power ( Civ.
Code, § 33), where the whole tenor of the contract alleged
points to its being the agreement of the mother for plaintiff's
and her benefit, and no obligations are assumed thereunder
by plaintiff.
[2] Id.- Support- Contract.- In an action by an illegitimate
minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an
oral contract entered into by the father and mother for the
[2] See 13 Cal.Jur. 936; 7 Am.Jur. 675.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 7-10, 12, 15, 22] Illegitimacy, § 19;
[3,4,6,14] Illegitimacy, §23; [5] Pleading, §101; [11] Illegitimacy, § 21; [13] Contracts, § 98; [16] Frauds, Statute of, § 3;
[17] Frauds, Statute of,§ 17; [18] Frauds, Statute of, § 23; [19]
Frauds, Statute of, § 4; [20] Frauds, Statute of, § 27; [21] Election of Remedies, § 2; [23] Abatement, § 7.
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support and education of the child, defendant cannot successfully urge that plaintiff is the contracting party, and that his
mother acted in a solely representative capacity in bargaining
away his right of action against his father for support ( Civ.
Code, § 196a), by agreeing not to institute a suit, where the
mother's only agreement was that she would not institute
a paternity suit during her pregnancy.
Id.- Support- Pleading.- In an action by an illegitimate
minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an
oral contract entered into by the father and mother for the
support and education of the child, an allegation in the complaint that before the contract the mother told the father
that she was going to institute a suit in behalf of plaintiff is
of little significance in establishing that she therefore contracted as plaintiff's agent.
Id.- Support- Pleading.- In an action by an illegitimate
minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an
oral contract entered into by the father and mother for the
support and education of the child, an allegation in the complaint that plaintiff and his mother performed all the terms
of the contract by them to bP performed, and an allegation
that the mother alone did that, are at most a stating of different theories.
Pleading-Demurrer-Determination.-If a complaint is sustainable on any theory it is not vulnerable to a general demurrer.
Illegitimacy-Support--Pleading.-In an action by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for breach
of an oral contract entered into by the father and mother for
the support and education of the child, defendant cannot successfully urge that the contract constituted a compromise of
a minor's claim which has not been approved by the court
and is therefore invalid (Pro b. Code, § 1431), where the
amended complaint added to the contract a clause stating that
plaintiff's right to support is not abrogated and compromised
by the contract.
Id.- Support- Contract. -An agreement under which the
mother of an illegitimate child agrees not to institute paternity
proceedings during her pregnancy, but remains free to do so
after the birth of the child, is not a waiver of any of the
child's rights before birth, but only an agreement not to prosecute them.
Id.-Support--Contract--Consideration.-In an action by an
illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for
breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and
mother for the support and education of the child, defendant
cannot successfully assert that there was no consideration for
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the contract inasmuch as plaintiff is not bound thereby because it was not approved by the court as required by Prob.
Code, § 1431, and therefore his father was not bound because
there was no mutuality of obligation, where plaintiff is the
third party beneficiary of the contract and no performance
is required by him.
[9] Id.-Support-Contract.-A provision in an oral contract
entered into by the father and mother of an unborn illegitimate child, that the mother "during the remainder of her . . .
pregnancy until the birth of said child shall institute no action
or proceeding in any Court to establish judicially . . . that
[the father] is or will be the father of said child," clearly
contemplates that the mother will not directly or indirectly
cause litigation to be instituted involving the question of the
father's paternity before the child is born.
[10] Id.-Support-Contract.-The mother of an unborn illegitimate child has an interest in maintaining an action for the
support of the child during her pregnancy, since the obligation
to support the child is imposed on both the father and mother
( Civ. Code, § 196a), and in agreeing to refrain from suing
she suffers a detriment.
[11] !d.-Support-By Whom Action Brought.-The mother of an
unborn illegitimate child has the legal right to bring an action
for the child's support after conception and before birth.
[12] Id.-Support-Contract-Consideration.-The promise of the
mother of an unborn illegitimate child to name the child
after the father is valid consideration for a contract whereby
the father agrees to support the child.
[13] Contracts-Consideration.-The validity of consideration for
a contract does not depend on its value.
[14] Illegitimacy-Support-Pleading.-In an action by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for
breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and
mother for the support and education of the child, defendant
cannot successfully urge that the complaint alleges a contract
the consent of the father to which was obtained by threats of
injury to his character, and that the contract alleged is therefore unenforceable, where the complaint alleges only that prior
to the making of the contract the mother declared her intention
of instituting a filiation action if the father did not acknowledge paternity, and where a sufference by the father of unfavorable publicity would only be an incident to that suit.
[15] !d.-Support-Contract-Consideration.-In an action by an
illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for
breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and
mother for the support and education of the child, it cannot
be said that the contract alleged is so unconscionable and
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shocking as to require an examination into the adequacy of
the consideration, where it appears from the complaint that
plaintiff is the illegitimate son of the decedent, who left an
estate in excess of $2,000,000, and that plaintiff's mother is in
penurious circumstances; where the promise to name plaintiff
after the decedent and to forbear bringing a paternity action
prior to his birth may have had great intrinsic value and where
the obligation assumed by decedent was one imposed on him
by law. (Civ. Code, § 196a.)
[16] Frauds, Statute of-Agreements on Consideration of Marriage.-In an action by an illegitimate minor against his
father's estate for damages for breach of an oral contract
entered into by the father and mother for the support and
education of the child, defendant cannot successfully assert
that the complaint alleges a contract which is unenforceable
because made on the consideration of marriage and not in
writing ( Civ. Code, § 1624(3); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(3)),
where the reference to marriage in the contract was merely
a recital that the mother and another were about to be married, that on the birth of plaintiff after such marriage he would
bear the surname of the husband, but that no liability was to
be imposed on him for plaintiff's support.
[17a, 17b] Id.-Promise to Answer for Debt of Another.-In an
action by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for
damages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the
father and mother for the support and education of the child,
defendant cannot successfully assert that the complaint alleges
a contract within the statutes requiring a writing for a special promise to answer for the debt of another ( Civ. Code,
§ 1624(2); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(2)), where, from the terms
of the contract, it is within the exception of the statutes, in
that the father's promise to support plaintiff is an original
obligation running to the mother upon the consideration that
she will name the child after the father and refrain from
bringing a paternity action. ( Civ. Code, § 2794( 4) .)
[18] !d.-Promises on Consideration Beneficial to Promisor.Whenever a promise to answer an antecedent obligation of
another is made upon a fresh consideration beneficial to the
promisor, no matter from what source it may move, the promise is an original one and valid though oral; whenever the
leading and main object of the promisor is not to become
surety or guarantor of another, but to subserve some purpose
or interest of his own, his promise is not within the statute of
frauds, although the effect of the promise may be to pay the
debt or discharge the obligation of another.
[18] See 12 Cal.Jur. 869; 49 Am.Jur. 426.
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[19] !d.-Agreements not Performed in Lifetime.-In an action
by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the father
and mother for the support and education of the child, defendant cannot successfully assert that the complaint alleges
a contract required to be in writing because by its terms it is
not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor and
is a promise to devise property (Civ. Code, § 1624(6); Code
Civ. Proc., §1973(6)), where the contract provides that the
life insurance policies to be furnished by the father shall he
fully paid-up policies.
[20] !d.-Agreements for Sale of Personal Property.-In an action by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for
damages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the
father and mother for the support and education of the child,
defendant cannot successfully assert that the complaint alleges
a contract required to be in writing because it is one for the
sale of personal property having a value in excess of $500
(Civ. Code, §§ 1624a, 1724; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973a), where
the agreement of the father is merely to furnish the money
necessary to obtain paid-up life insurance policies to secure
the financial obligations assumed in the contract.
[21] Election of Remedies-Definition.-An election of remedies
is the choosing between two or more different, coexisting and
inconsistent modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on
the same state of facts.
[22] Illegitimacy-Support-Election of Remedies.-In an action
by an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages for breach of an oral contract entered into by the father
and mother for the support and education of the child, defendant cannot successfully assert that plaintiff made an election
of remedies by bringing a prior action under the general support provisions of Civ. Code, § 196a, where the facts are not
the same, in that the contract makes precise provision as to
what shall be paid for support, and where the remedies are
not inconsistent, in that the contract expressly provides that
plaintiff's rights to proceed under the statute are not thereby
abrogated.
[23] Abatement--Pendency of Another Action.-In an action by
an illegitimate minor against his father's estate for damages
for breach of an oral contract entered into by the father and
mother for the support and education of the child, defendant
cannot successfully plead another action pending, where that
action has gone to final judgment and has been affirmed on
appeal, and where that action would not be res judicata be[21] See 10 Cal.Jur. 3; 18 Am.Jur. 129.
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cause it decided only that plaintiff's action under the general
support provisions of Civ. Code, § 196a, did not survive the
death of his father.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Reversed.
Action against a father's estate on a contract for support
and education of an illegitimate child. Judgment of dismissal
reversed.
Maurice Rose for Appellant.
Loeb & Loeb, Gang, Kopp & Tyre, Keating Coffey, Robert
E. Kopp and Milton A. Rudin for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after defendants' demurrer was sustained without leave to amend in an action against a father's estate on a
contract for the support and education of an illegitimate
child.
Plaintiff, J ohan Richard Wallace Schumm, is a minor born
on February 7, 1948; he prosecutes the action by his guardian
ad litem, Kay Whyner. Defendants are the executors of the
estate of Wallace Beery, deceased. According to the complaint, the following facts appear: Plaintiff is the son of
Beery and Gloria Schumm, neither of whom was married.
He was conceived as the result of an act of sexual intercourse
between Beery and Gloria on May 18, 1947. In August, 1947,
Gloria's request of Beery that he marry her to legitimatize
the expected child being refused, she demanded that he acknowledge his paternity of the expected child or she would
institute proceedings to have him declared the father and for
support of the child. Beery believed, and it was a likely result, that such a suit would be damaging to his social and
professional standing as a prominent motion picture star.
Under these circumstances, in August, 1947, while Gloria
was pregnant with the child (and acting as the agent of the
child-see discussion later herein), and for his express benefit, she entered into an oral agreement with Beery as follows:
"WHEREAS, said Gloria Schumm conceived a child by said
Wallace Beery as the result of an act of sexual intercourse
between them in the County of Los ,Angeles, State of California, on or about May 18, 1947, and is now pregnant with said
child; and
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"WHEREAS, said Wallace Beery is a man of great wealth
with very substantial income and well able to make adequate
provision for the support and education of said expected child,
suitable to Wallace Beery's circumstances, station in life and
standard of living; and
"WHEREAS, said Gloria Schumm is penurious, without property or income and penniless and is unable to make any provision for the support or education of said expected child ;
and
"WHEREAS, Gloria Schumm is about to marry one, Hans
Schumm; and
"WHEREAS, neither of the parties hereto wish to impose
upon said Hans Schumm any responsibility for the maintenance and support of the said child of said Wallace Beery; and
"WHEREAS, said Wallace Beery deems it to be to his best
interests, social and financial, that no suit be instituted against
him in any Court for a public adjudication that he is the
father of said expected child and for that reason desires to
avoid such paternity suit and the unfavorable publicity such
suit might entail.
"Now, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants hereof, said Wallace Beery and Gloria Schumm agree
as follows:
"(a) The said Gloria Schumm during the remainder of the
period of her said pregnancy until the birth of said child shall
institute no action or proceeding in any Court to establish
judicially the fact that said Wallace Beery is or will be the
father of said child.
"(b) Upon the marriage of said Gloria Schumm and Hans
Schumm, said expected child if born alive shall be surnamed
'Schumm' and its name if a male shall include said Beery's
Christian name 'Wallace,' or if a female, shall include said
Beery's nickname 'Wally.'
'' (c) Wallace Beery, if said child be born alive, recognizes
and acknowledges the claim of Gloria Schumm in behalf
of said expected child that he is morally and legally responsible for the support and education of said child in a manner
suitable to said Wallace Beery's circumstances, station in
life and standard of living from the date of the birth of said
child until said child shall become 21 years of age, or until
the death of said child, whichever shall occur sooner, and the
said Wallace Beery recognizes the claim of Gloria Schumm in
behalf of said expected child that he is morally responsible
to afford said child a fair start in its adult life, and that
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considering the wealth and earning capacity of Wall ace Beery
the sum of $25,000 would be reasonable for such purpose and
shotud be supplied by Wallace Beery to said child for such
start.
"(d) Promptly upon the.birth of said child, if born alive,
said Wallace Beery shall purchase and acquire and deliver
to and for said child two fully paid-up policies of a Life Insurance Company, to-wit: (1) one fully paid-up policy to be
applied on account of the ·support and education of said
child, whereby the Life Insurance Company shall have agreed
to pay to said child beginning as of the date of his birth
until he shall have reached the age of 21 years, or until his
death, whichever occurs sooner, the sum of $100 per week;
(2) a second fully paid-up policy on the Twenty Year Endowment plan, to afford said child a fair start in its adult life,
whereby the Life Insurance Company on said child's twentyfirst birthday, if he be then living, shall have agreed to pay
to said child the sum of $25,000; the said child to have no interest in the life insurance features, if any, of said policies,
which shall be exclusively matters of Wallace Beery's own
concern; provided however, that said Wallace Beery in lieu
of said first mentioned policy to be applied on account of
support and education may promptly on the birth of said
child designate a Bank in the City of Los Angeles, State of
California as Trustee, and forthwith deposit with such Trustee interest or dividend bearing securities sufficient in amount
to yield over and above the Trustee's charges and costs, a
minimum net income of $100 per week, with provision in the
Trust Agreement that the Trustee, beginning from the date
of the birth of said child until the said child reaches the age
of 21 years, or until said child's death, whichever occurs
sooner, shall pay to said child the sum of $100 per week
'' (e) Said child shall be maintained, supported and educated as befitting a child of a prominent public man of wealth.
Recognizing that the child's receipts under one of said policies
of $100 per week will be wholly inadequate to accomplish the
desired result, even without taking into account illness of
the child from time to time during its minority, possible accidents, educational and other extraordinary unforeseen expenses, it is stipulated that nothing hereinbefore stated shall
be deemed to be an intention on the part of any of the parties
hereto to modify, decrease or compromise the legal and moral
obligations of Wallace Beery to his said child to provide it
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during its minority with the necessary funds for its maintenance, support and education according to the station in life
and standard of living of Wallace Beery."
Pursuant thereto Gloria married Hans Schumm on August 21, 1947, and on the birth of plaintiff, gave him the
name above mentioned including "Wallace" and the surname ''Schumm''; no proceeding was instituted until after
the birth. Beery refused to comply with any of the provisions of the contract, except he paid nine weekly installments
of $25, beginning July 6, 1948. Damages of $104,135 are
claimed. Beery died and a claim against his estate was rejected. Another phase of the controversy has been decided
on appeal. (Schumm v. Beery, 100 Cal.App.2d 407 [224
P.2d 54].)
[1] In support of the order sustaining the demurrer defendants assert that it is alleged in the complaint that Gloria
''acting as agent of said expected child [plaintiff] expressly
for his benefit'' entered into the contract, that is, the contract
was plaintiff's contract made by Gloria as his agent; that,
therefore, it is void because ''a minor cannot give a delegation
of power." (Civ. Code, § 33.) Plaintiff asserts, however,
that the contract was not between him and Beery but between
Gloria and Beery for the benefit of plaintiff as a third party
beneficiary. (There is no dispute that recovery may be had
on such a contract, if valid.) The matter turns, therefore,
on whether the complaint shows such a contract. It does
allege that the contract was made by Gloria "acting as agent"
for the expected child. That allegation was stricken, but the
complaint goes on to state that she entered into the contract
"expressly for his benefit." It is said in the contract that
Gloria and Beery ''agree'' to the then following terms. She
agrees not to institute a paternity suit during pregnancy,
hardly something the child could agree that she would not do.
The whole tenor of the contract points to its being between
Gloria and Beery for plaintiff's and Gloria's benefit. There
are no obligations assumed by plaintiff in the contract. Moreover, it might be mentioned that under some authorities thfl
theory of liability under a contract in favor of a third party
beneficiary, that the contracting party-promisee was the agent
for the beneficiary, is purely a fiction. (Corbin on Contracts,
§ 794.) The allegations indicating agency may well refer to
a fictional agency. The creditor's claim that was filed against
Beery's estate states that Gloria and Beery entered into the
contract.
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[2] Defendants assert that under section 196a of the Civil
Code, a mother of an illegitimate child has no action against
the father for its support, but only an action in a representative capacity on behalf of the child, and that in agreeing not
to institute a suit, plaintiff's right was bargained away, and
therefore, plaintiff must be the contracting party, and Gloria
acted solely in a representative capacity. There may be some
logic in the argument, but it may also be said that she is not
promising away plaintiff's right, as possibly she could not
do; she is agreeing that she will not take steps to enforce it,
and that only before the birth of the child.
[3] Defendants point to allegations that before the contract, Gloria told Beery she was going to institute suit m
behalf of plaintiff. We see little significance in that. It
does not necessarily show that therefore she contracted as
plaintiff's agent. [4] Reference is also made to an allegation that plaintiff and Gloria performed all the terms of the
contract to be by them performed. But it is also alleged that
Gloria alone did that. At most it is a stating of different
theories. [5] If a complaint is sustainable on any theory it is
not vulnerable to a general demurrer. (Lord v. Garland,
27 Cal.2d 840 [168 P.2d 5].)
[6] Defendants contend that the contract constituted a
compromise of a minor's claim which has not been approved
by the court pursuant to section 1431 of the Probate Code
and is therefore invalid. This is predicated on the assertion
that the consideration for Beery's promises was a promise
that no action would be brought for the child's support which
is a compromise of the plaintiff's right to support. The contract does not purport to be a compromise of plaintiff's right
to support. It will be remembered that the last sentence in
the contract states that plaintiff's right to support is not
abrogated or compromised by the contract. It is true that
that clause was added to the contract by the amended complaint, but that does not require that it be ignored as it is
not contrary to the original complaint. It is merely an additional term added to a contract alleged in the origimil complaint. Therefore, it is not within the alleged rule urged
by plaintiff that facts once alleged cannot be withdrawn for
consideration by filing an amended complaint. [7] As we
have seen before, Gloria agreed only not to institute proceedings before the birth of plaintiff. After the birth she was
free to commence proceedings. That was not a waiver of any

,,
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of plaintiff's rights before birth. It was only that she would
not prosecute them.
[8] Defendants contend that for various reasons there was
no consideration for the contract. It is asserted that inasmuch
as plaintiff was not bound by the contract because it was not
approved under section 1431 of the Probate Code, Beery was
not bound because there was no mutuality of obligation. 'fhat
argument is predicated upon the assumption that the contract was between plaintiff and Beery, which, as pointed out,
is not the case. Plaintiff is the third party beneficiary of
the contract and there is no performance required of him.
Defendants assert that Gloria's promise not to institute suit
and to name plaintiff after Beery is not consideration. We
cannot agree with either assertion.
On the first proposition, the argument runs to the effect
that it is the illegitimate child's right under section 196a of
the Civil Code to enforce the obligation of the father to
support it; that the mother has no right except to bring the
action in a representative capacity on the child's behalf; that,
therefore, in agreeing not to sue she has suffered no detriment,
for having no right, she gave up nothing; that a forbearance
to sue on a void claim is not good consideration. [9] Before
dealing with that contention we note defendants' claim that
there was no promise not to institute proceedings, for the
promise does not say no action of any kind will be instituted
by a guardian or otherwise. The promise (quoted supra) is
plain enough. It clearly contemplates that Gloria will not
directly or indirectly cause litigation to be instituted involving the question of Beery being the father of the child before
the child is born.
[10] The mother does have a definite interest in maintaining the action, for under section 196a the obligation to support is imposed upon both the mother and father. If the
mother does not bring an action against the father and he
refuses to give support, she will have to bear it. To the extent
that she obtains relief against the father in such an action
she is relieved of that burden. In agreeing to refrain
from suing she is thereby suffering a detriment. It is not
a case, therefore, where a person has no right of action and
thus could not be benefited by a forbearance to prosecute an
action. [11] Gloria had the legal right to bring an action
after conception and before birth. (Davis v. Strottd, 52 Cal.
App.2d 308 [126 P.2d 409] ; Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal.App.2d 122
[100 P.2d 806].
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[12] Gloria's promise to name plaintiff after Beery (given
name Wallace) was adequate consideration to support the
contract. It was a detriment to Gloria and a benefit to
Beery. The privilege of naming a child is valid consideration for a promise. (Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218 [42 N.E.
1127, 52 Am.St.Rep. 511]; Daily v. Minnick, 117 Iowa 563
[91 N.W. 913, 60 L.R.A. 840]; Garclner v. Denison, 217 Mass.
492 [105 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A.N.S. 1108]; Wolforcl v. Powers,
85 Ind. 294 [44 Am. Rep. 16] ; see Green v. Green, 298 Mass.
19 [9 N.E.2d 413]; New .Jersey Orth. Hasp. & Dispensary v.
Wright, 95 N.J. 462 [113 A. 144] ; Freeman v. Morris, 131
Wis. 216 [109 N.W. 983, 120 Am.St.Rep. 1038, 11 Ann.Cas.
481] ; Babcock v. Chase, 92 Hun. 264 [36 N.Y.S. 879] ; Corbin
on Contracts, § 127 ; Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), § 115.)
This is in accord with the principle that the law will not
enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the consideration.
(6 Cal.Jur 189; Williston on Contracts (rev.ed.), § 115; Rest.,
Contracts, § 81.) Defendants attack the foregoing authorities
by asserting that they are dicta or based upon an authority
not in point or did not give serious consideration to the
question of the sufficiency of the ''right to name'' as consideration. They have cited no authority to the contrary, however, and two eminent authorities on contracts (Corbin and
Williston, s~tpra) have cited them for that proposition. Reason
supports the rule, for having a child bear its father's name
is commonly considered a privilege and honor, and Beery
assumed it was, for he obtained such a promise running to him.
Merely because in the cited cases the promise was to use
the putative father's surname does not make them distinguishable. [13] That is merely a matter of degree, and as seen, the
validity of consideration does not depend on its value.
Defendants refer to recitations in the contract that Beery
was prominent and did not want the possible adverse publicity
resulting from the instigation of a paternal suit. But that
was only for the period prior to birth, and as seen, the promise
to name the child after him was in his favor and presumably
he considered it valuable.
[14] The contract is not enforceable, say defendants, because the consent of Beery to it was obtained by threats of
injury to his character. However, the complaint does not
allege that Gloria would injure his character if he did not
enter into the contract. It is alleged that prior to the date
of the contract "upon the decedent's [Beery] refusal of a
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request . . . Gloria . . . had made that the decedent by
marrying her legitimatize said expected child, said Gloria
Schumm demanded that the decedent, in writing or by deed
and act, clearly acknowledge that he is the father of said
expected child, and said Gloria . . . then intended and there
declared to the decedent her purpose and intention, upon the
failure of the decedent to effect such paternal acknowledgment, promptly to institute in behalf of said expected child
a suit in this [Superior] Court for a decree adjudging the
decedent to be the father of said expected child and requiring
decedent to make adequate and proper provision for the
maintenance, support and education of said expected child
before and after its birth and during its minority." She
merely said she would commence a suit, a right she clearly had
as hereinbefore seen. A sufference by him of unfavorable
publicity would only be an incident of the suit.
[15] Mixed with this contention is the claim that while
adequacy of consideration is not important ordinarily, it is,
where the contract is unconscionable and shocking. (See
Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409 [71 P.2d 220].) We
cannot say, however, that the contract falls within such a rule,
at least on the present state of the record. It must be assumed
(from the allegations of the complaint) that plaintiff is the
illegitimate son of BAery; that Beery left an estate of over $2,000,000; that Gloria is in ''penurious circumstances''; the use
of his name and forbearance to bring an action may have
great intrinsic value. The obligation assumed by him is one
imposed by law. ( Civ. Code, § 196a.)
Defendants assert that the contract being oral is unenforceable because of various provisions of the statute of
frauds. [16] First, is the provision requiring'' an agreement
made upon consideration of marriage" to be in writing. (Civ.
Code,§ 1624(3); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(3).) This is predir,ated on the clause recited in the contract that "WHEREAS,
Gloria is about to marry'' Schumm and neither Gloria nor
Beery wish to impose upon him any responsibility for plaintiff's support; that upon such marriage plaintiff's name shall
be "Schumm"; that Gloria and Schumm were married and
the child so named. The amended complaint does not necessarily establish that a marriage between Gloria and Schumm
was consideration for the contract. The reference in the
contract was merely a recital that they were about to marry
and that no liability was to be imposed upon Schumm.
Plaintiff was to bear Schumm's name but that includes no
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promise to marry. It is not alleged, as asserted by defendants,
that in performance of the contract Gloria and Schumm were
married. Rather it is alleged that Gloria "having married
Schumm," on plaintiff's birth, he was named Schumm. It
then goes on to say what was done in performance of the
contract.
[17a] Second, the contract is within the provision requiring a writing for ''a special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in section 2794 of the Civil Code'' (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1973(2); Civ. Code,§ 1624(2)). It is asserted that Beery
promised to answer for the obligation of Schumm to support
plaintiff. It is reasoned that as Gloria and Schumm were
married when plaintiff was born, he was presumed legitimate
and Schumm was liable for his support. Assuming the
validity of that argument, it is predicated on the assumption
that the promise was to plaintiff. The promise was to Gloria
and obviously from the terms of the contract it was not to
answer for any default of Schumm's, but was an original
promise to Gloria. Among other reasons why the statute does not apply is the rule that a promise to answer
for the debt of another is deemed an original obligation and
not within the statute "Where the promise is upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from
either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another
person." ( Civ. Code, § 2794 ( 4).) [18] The rule is stated :
''Whenever a promise to answer an antecedent obligation
of another is made upon a fresh consideration beneficial to
the promisor, no matter from what source it may move, the
promise is an original one and valid though oral; or, as was
said in an early case, whenever the leading and main object
of the promisor is not to become surety or guarantor of another, but to subserve some purpose or interest of his own,
his promise is not within the statute, although the effect of
the promise may be to pay the debt or discharge the obligation
of another." (12 Cal.Jur., 869.) (See Greenfield v. Sudden
Lumber Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 709 [64 P.2d 1007] .) [17b] As we
have seen, Gloria's promise to name the child after Beery and
to refrain from instituting an action was beneficial to Beery.
This is in line with the basic principle that: ''The important
question, running through all cases dealing with the code
subdivision just quoted, is whether the promises made are in
fact assumptions of another's liability, or the primary obliga-
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tion of the promisor himself. In the former case, the promise
is within the statute and must be in writing, but in the latter
case the promise is valid, though verbal. The precise language
used in making the promise is important, as a slight change in
phraseology may have the effect of changing a promise,
intended to be conditional and collateral, into an independent
and original undertaking." ( 12 Cal.J ur. 864.)
[19] Third, the contract must be in writing, state defendants, for it is "by its terms not to be performed during the
lifetime of the promisor," (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(6); Civ.
Code, § 1624(6)) and it is a promise by Beery to devise
property (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(6); Civ. Code, § 1624(6) ).
The only argument advanced to support this argument is that
the agreement as a whole shows it was a contract to devise
property-the life insurance policies. Obviously, it is not
such a contract.
[20] Fourth, it is claimed that the contract is one for the
sale of personal property (a chose in action) having a value
in excess of $500; thus within the provision that: ''A contract
to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of
five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by
action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses
in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract,
or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in
writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be
charged, or his agent in that behalf.
'' 'l'he provisions of this section apply to every such contract
or sale, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to
be delivered at some future time or may not at the time of such
contract or sale be actually made, procured, or provided, or
fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the
making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for
delivery; but if the goods are to be manufactured by the
seller especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the
provisions of this section shall not apply.'' (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1973a; Civ. Code, §§ 1624a, 1724.) The reference is to the
provision in the contract, supra, in connection with Beery's
promise to support, that he will purchase and deliver on the
child's birth two paid up policies of insurance, one in which
the insurer would pay $100 per week to the child during
minority and the other under which the child is to receive
$25,000 on reaching majority.
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It should be quite clear that this was not intended as a sale.
Beery was not an insurance company and could not "sell"
insurance. He merely agreed to furnish the money necessary
to obtain such policies. It is true he promises to deliver them
but the main purpose was that he furnish the necessary funds
in order that the protection afforded by a reputable insurer be
secured. In lieu of the first policy a trust with a bank as
trustee may be established. Certainly, if Beery promised to
deposit the funds for support in a bank to Gloria's or the
child's credit, it would not be considered a sale of a chose in
action against the bank. The situation here is not substantially different. (Even if it be assumed that a sale of the
insurance policies was intended, it may be that the statute has
been satisfied in that ''part payment'' takes the case out of
the statute. Here all of the performance by Gloria has been
performed. She has refrained from instituting the action and
named plain tiff after Beery.)
Finally, it is asserted that plaintiff is barred from enforcing
the contract because he also instituted an action for support
under section 196a of the Civil Code. That action was commenced before Beery's death which occurred before it was
tried. The action was dismissed on the ground that the action
did not survive Beery's death. That judgment of dismissal
was affirmed. (Schumm v. Beery, supra, 100 Cal.App.2d
407.) Defendants' argument is twofold: that by commencing
that action plaintiff had made an election of remedies, that is,
to enforce his right under section 196a thus abandoning
the contract, and that the demurrer was sustainable on the
ground that another action was pending.
[21] As to election of remedies, plaintiff asserts that it
cannot be raised by demurrer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430). But,
assuming it may, the doctrine is not applicable here. The
general rule is stated: '' 'An election of remedies is defined
as the choosing between two or more different and coexisting
modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same
state of facts.' (9 R.C.L., p. 956.) 'Election of remedies has
been defined to be the rig·ht to choose or the act of choosing
between different actions or remedies where plaintiff has
suffered one species of wrong from the act complained of.
Broadly speaking, an election of remedies is the choice by a
plaintiff to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial
rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts,
but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party
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between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being
necessarily repugnant to or a repudiation of the other.' (20
C.J., p. 2.)" (Mansfield v. Pickwick Stages, 191 Cal. 129,
130 [215 P. 389] .) [22] The facts are not the same nor are the
remedies inconsistent. The instant action is on the contract,
which makes precise provision for what shall be paid for the
support. The other action was under the statute ( Civ. Code,
§ 196a) which is the general obligation to support. By
bringing the action under the statute, plaintiff did not abandon any right under the contract and the contract expressly
provides that it is not an abrogation of the right under the
statute. [23] On the claim of another action pending, that
action has gone to final judgment-affirmed on appeal. It
would not be res judicata ( Cf., Stevens v. Kelley, 57 Cal.
App.2d 318 [134 P.2d 56]) for all it determined was that an
action under section 196a does not survive the death of the
father.
Judgment reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 'rraynor, ,J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my view the opmwn prepared for the District Court of Appeal by Mr. Presiding
Justice Moore (reported at (Cal.App.) 224 P.2d 56) correctly
disposes of the questions presented. For the reasons therein
stated I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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prevailing party is proper only when the latter has sought
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